In recent years, there has been large growth in the nursing home industry in the use of case-mix adjusted Medicaid payment systems that employ resident characteristics to predict the relative use of resources in setting payment levels. Little attention has been paid to the access and quality incentives that these systems provide in the presence of excess demand conditions due to certificate-of-need (CON) and construction moratoria. Using 1991 to 1998 panel data for all certified U.S. nursing homes, a fixed-effects model indicates that adoption of a case-mix payment system led to increased access for more dependent residents, but the effect was modified in excess demand markets. Quality remained relatively stable with the introduction of case-mix reimbursement, regardless of the presence of excess demand conditions. These results suggest that CON and construction moratoria are still important barriers within the nursing home market, and recent quality assurance activities related to the introduction of case-mix payment systems may have been effective.
A principal goal of the Medicare-Medicaid legislation passed by Congress in 1965 was incorporation of the elderly and poor into ''mainstream'' medicine to help ensure an acceptable level of quality for Medicare-and Medicaid-eligible individuals (Mitchell and Cromwell 1980) . Because the Medicaid and Medicare programs pay below the private-pay price in many health care markets, however, access to services has continued to be an important issue for public-pay patients. A number of studies have observed that Medicaid recipients experience a delay in gaining access to nursing home care relative to private-paying individuals (Feder and Scanlon 1980; Shapiro, Roos and Kavanaugh 1980; Gruenberg and Willemain 1982; Friedman 1982; Greenless, Marshall, and Yett 1982; Weissert and Cready 1988; U.S. General Accounting Office 1990; Ettner 1993) . Moreover, many of these studies indicate that more dependent, or ''heavy-care,'' Medicaid individuals have the longest delays in obtaining care. These individuals typically are cared for in the hospital, in other long-term care settings or informally by family and friends until they can be placed in a nursing home. These delays in obtaining care for heavy-care Medicaid recipients have been shown to significantly increase patient costs (U.S. General Accounting Office 1990) and may affect health care outcomes negatively if patients are not receiving the appropriate care.
Historically, the source of this access problem has been twofold. First, many state Medicaid programs did not vary payment rates across nursing home residents with different care needs. With a uniform payment rate for all levels of care, light-care Medicaid residents have been associated with higher net revenue as compared with heavy-care residents. Secondly, the presence of bed constraint regulations, such as certificate-of-need (CON) and construction moratoria, limited the supply of available Medicaid beds, which ultimately resulted in the exclusion of heavy-care (i.e., lower net revenue) Medicaid recipients. To address this access issue, many states have adopted case-mix adjusted payment systems, which use resident characteristics to predict the relative use of resources for the purposes of Medicaid reimbursement. Between 1981 and 1998, the number of state Medicaid programs employing case-mix methods grew from four to 26 (Swan et al. 2000) .
Although there are several case-mix methods currently in practice that employ alternative formulas, the majority of systems classify residents into homogeneous categories based on their resource utilization. Associated with each of these categories is a case-mix index (CMI), which represents, at least relatively, the time or cost of the average resident in the group (Fries 1990) . A higher CMI indicates a greater degree of complexity and, consequently, a greater need for input resources. Perhaps the best-known methodology of this type is the ''resource utilization groups'' (RUG) system, which is currently in its third version (Fries et al. 1994) . The RUG-III system, with 44 distinct resource groups, has been shown to achieve 55.5% variance explanation of total per diem costs for nursing home residents (Fries et al. 1994) .
Although researchers have evaluated the statistical validity of case-mix reimbursement methodologies (e.g., Fries 1990 ), there has been only limited effort directed at evaluating the economic implications of these systems (Norton 2000) . Previous research has recognized that these systems encourage nursing homes to admit sicker patients, and also may have adverse quality effects, creating disincentives to rehabilitate in order to keep residents in a higher payment category, incentives to provide unnecessary care (e.g., encouraging the use of urinary catheters rather than a bladder training program), and incentives to misreport (or ''upcode'') resident conditions or services (Butler and Schlenker 1989; Smits 1984) . 1 Previous research has not considered the adoption of these policies in the context of bed constraint regulations. Because the source of the access problem in nursing homes is twofold-a uniform Medicaid payment level combined with bed constraint regulations-case-mix adjusted reimbursement may not necessarily solve the access issue for heavycare residents. With a bed constraint, homes will admit only those most profitable patients, who-depending on the design of the case-mix payment system-may or may not be heavier care patients. Furthermore, a bed constraint may provide nursing homes with little incentive to compete on the basis of quality for the care of residents. In essence, case-mix reimbursement rewards homes for the admittance and care of the most dependent residents, but it does not address the high degree of market power enjoyed by nursing homes under CON laws and moratoria.
Thus, this study examines two related issues involving the adoption of case-mix adjusted reimbursement for nursing home care in the presence of these regulations. First, it asks: Does case-mix reimbursement increase the amount of care provided for more dependent residents? Second, does case-mix reimbursement increase nursing home quality, as represented by staffing, outcome, and process measures of quality?
Previous Research
Previous studies have shown that the adoption of case-mix adjusted payment systems has encouraged the admittance of more dependent Medicaid residents. These studies generally have taken the approach of using either pre-and post-case-mix adoption data for a single state or a single cross-section of data comparing states with and without case-mix reimbursement. Using the first approach, Holahan and Cohen (1987) found that case-mix indices (such as the need for assistance with medications, dressing, eating, and bathing) increased by 7.5% in Illinois between 1978 and 1980 with the implementation of a case-mix payment system. Feder and Scanlon (1989) examined the adoption of a case-mix payment system in Maryland between 1982 and 1984 and found that there was a 6% increase in an activities of daily living (ADL) index and a 10-percentage point drop in the proportion of light-care residents. Using 1985 and 1986 New York state data, Thorpe, Gertler, and Goldman (1991) also found that nursing homes admitted more heavy-care patients and reduced days of care to lighter-care patients after the implementation of a RUG-II case-mix payment system. Specifically, a typical home's case-mix index (as determined by the RUG-II system) increased 5.5% under case-mix reimbursement.
Using cross-sectional data, Schlenker (1991) analyzed 1985 facility-level data to compare nursing homes in three states that had implemented case-mix reimbursement with homes in four states that had not. The results generally showed resident dependency to be higher in the three states that employed case-mix payment systems. Using national 1981 data from the Medicare/Medicaid Automated Certification files, Cohen and Dubay (1990) did not find a statistically significant relationship between the presence of case-mix reimbursement and resident dependency. However, the authors note that the small sample of homes in states with casemix systems might have accounted for the lack of significance of this variable.
In an alternative research design, Norton (1992) used data from a social experiment conducted in 36 nursing homes in San Diego to test whether case-mix incentive payments improved access for heavy-care Medicaid patients. Norton found that case-mix payment for services encouraged the ''experimental'' homes to admit individuals with greater functional disability relative to the ''control'' homes that paid a flat rate across all levels of disability.
Several studies also have examined the implications of case-mix reimbursement for nursing home quality. Once again, these studies generally have examined the pre-and post-adoption periods in a single state or examined a crosssection of data across multiple states. These studies have used both structural (i.e., staffing) and nonstructural (i.e., processes and outcomes of care) measures of nursing home quality. Using staffing as a proxy for quality, Feder and Scanlon (1989) compared actual and predicted staffing levels before and after the adoption of case-mix reimbursement in Maryland. ''Predicted staffing'' was the staffing level that the Maryland Medicaid program used to set casemix adjusted payment rates based on the severity of resident needs. Overall, there was not a significant increase in the difference between predicted and actual staffing with the implemen-tation of case-mix reimbursement. However, of those homes that experienced a larger than 5% increase in the severity of their case mix, slightly more than half had deficient nurse staffing following the adoption of case-mix reimbursement-a 50% increase over the pre-case-mix reimbursement period. New York nursing homes also did not increase staff proportional to the increase in resident acuity with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement (Butler and Schlenker 1989) . However, Holahan and Cohen (1987) found an increase in nursing resources with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement in West Virginia. Using a single cross-section of national data from the 1981 Medicaid-Medicare Automated Certification system, Cohen and Dubay (1990) were not able to show a statistically significant relationship between case-mix reimbursement and nurse staffing.
Several studies also have employed nonstaffing-based measures of quality, such as processes (e.g., catheter use rate) or outcomes (e.g., pressure ulcer rate) of care. These studies generally have examined whether homes have responded to quality incentives built into case-mix reimbursement systems or whether case-mix reimbursement has provided any adverse quality incentives. The evidence is mixed as to whether homes respond to positive quality incentives. For example, Butler and Schlenker (1989) reported that bonuses in the New York and Minnesota systems for increased resident functioning did not encourage more restorative care. However, Schlenker and colleagues (1988) found that higher payments for turning and positioning and nonpayment for ''avoidable'' pressure ulcers were associated with a lower ulcer prevalence rate in Maryland. 2 Similarly, Butler and Schlenker (1989) found that the incidence of pressure ulcers fell 38% in the six months following the introduction of a payment for pressure ulcer prevention in Illinois. On the other hand, a poorly designed system can provide adverse quality incentives to nursing facilities under case-mix reimbursement. Schlenker and colleagues (1988) report that additional payments for catheterized residents resulted in increased catheterization rates in West Virginia. Similarly, Feder and Scanlon (1989) found that tube feeding increased 91.7% and oxygen therapy increased 100% with the adoption of Maryland's case-mix system. 3
In sum, the previous literature generally has shown increased resident dependency and lower quality under a case-mix reimbursement system. Although these previous studies have provided important information on the effects of case-mix reimbursement, these studies have several limitations. First, the majority employed data from a single state, which draws into question the generalizability of the findings for other casemix systems. Similarly, because these studies were isolated to a single state, there is limited variation in the tightness of the bed supply to examine the effects of CON and moratoria on the implementation of a case-mix reimbursement system. Second, for those studies that did use data from multiple states, the researchers employed a single cross-section of data, which might have resulted in biased estimates if unobserved factors were correlated with the crossstate variation in the adoption of case-mix reimbursement. With a cross-sectional research design, one cannot rule out the presence of a third unobserved factor that affects both the implementation of case-mix reimbursement and access (or quality of care) for those more dependent residents. Finally, all of the previous studies relied on data from the 1980s, which does not take into account recent shifts in the market for nursing home care.
This study addresses all of these issues by using facility-level data with multiple dependency and quality measures for all Medicaid-and Medicare-certified nursing homes over the period 1991 through 1998. Although the estimation strategy will be discussed in detail subsequently, this study employs a fixed-effects model, which exploits within-state variations in the regressors and outcomes, and as a result, automatically controls for time-invariant factors that differ across states. This study represents the first examination of the adoption of case-mix reimbursement using national time-series data from all certified U.S. nursing homes. The following section discusses a conceptual framework for analyzing the adoption of case-mix reimbursement in the presence of CON and moratoria before turning to an empirical examination of these issues.
Conceptual Framework
Medicaid, the dominant payer of nursing home services in the United States, gives financially indigent individuals access to nursing homes by directly reimbursing homes for the care of Medicaid-eligible residents. Care of Medicaid residents comprises roughly 45% to 50% of all long-stay nursing home expenditures and 70% of all bed days, with the remainder of care financed primarily by private out-of-pocket payments (Rhoades and Sommers 2000) . States have considerable discretion in setting Medicaid payment methods and rates. Medicaid rates paid to nursing homes are, on average, approximately two-thirds of the private-pay price (Rhoades and Sommers 2000) . Historically, nearly all states have employed retrospective-(or cost-) based systems where the Medicaid payment is determined after the provision of care, and is based completely on the costs incurred by the facility. Currently, the majority of states employ prospective-based payment systems in which rates are set in advance of care. Generally, prospective methods use facility-and resident-level information from previous years to determine a fixed payment rate to facilities. Case-mix reimbursement is an attempt to adjust this fixed rate across residents with different care needs.
Beginning with the influential work of Scanlon (1980) , researchers have posited that the presence of bed constraint regulations have placed the market for nursing home care in a state of excess demand. Although CON and construction moratoria are designed to control government expenditures by limiting the number of nursing home beds, these policies also create barriers to entry for new providersyielding excess demand for nursing home care in many markets. Within an excess demand model of the nursing home market, a facility first satisfies private-pay demand and then fills the remaining beds with lower-paying Medicaid residents. Because every Medicaid recipient will not be able to find an open bed, nursing homes potentially may benefit from these laws by reducing the quality of care (e.g., Nyman 1985; Gertler 1989; Grabowski 2001b) and choosing not to serve heavy-care Medicaid patients (e.g., Nyman, Levey, and Rohrer 1987) . In 1998, 44 states still had CON or moratorium policies in place (Harrington et al. 1999) .
Although analyses from the late 1970s and early 1980s found evidence of excess demand conditions (e.g., Scanlon 1980; Nyman 1989) , more recent studies of the market for nursing home care have noted that CON and construction moratorium policies no longer may be as important towards constraining the growth of the nursing home market (Nyman 1993) . Occupancy rates, an indirect measure of excess demand, have been declining over the last two decades. The national occupancy rate was 92.9% in 1977 92.9% in , 91.8% in 1985 92.9% in , and 87.4% in 1995 92.9% in (Strahan 1997 . Furthermore, there has been a recent decline in the number of empty beds per 1,000 elderly (age 65ϩ) individuals. Using 1969 and 1973 data from 43 states, Scanlon (1980) found five empty beds per 1,000 elderly individuals. The data analyzed in this study showed 9.8 empty beds in 1991 and 12.3 empty beds per 1,000 elderly by 1998. These trends provide some evidence that excess demand conditions may be lessening in many nursing home markets, perhaps due to the growth of alternative care arrangements such as assisted living facilities and changing medical protocols that have reduced the incidence of some conditions, such as stroke or cardiovascular debilitating disease.
Given this recent shift in the market for nursing home care, this analysis considers the adoption of case-mix reimbursement in markets with and without excess demand for nursing home care. In the absence of excess demand conditions, homes have an incentive to admit Medicaid recipients under a prospective-based system until the marginal cost of caring for an additional resident equals the marginal revenue associated with the predetermined Medicaid payment rate. 4 Under a uniform payment rate, the incentives are strongest to first accept lighter-care patients for which the differential between the Medicaid rate (MR) and marginal cost (MC) is typically largest. Case-mix reimbursement is hypothesized to improve access to care for heavy-care residents by addressing the relative size of the differential (MR-MC) across light-, moderate-and heavy-care residents. Thus, in a nursing home market without a binding CON or moratorium, the adoption of a casemix payment system is predicted to increase access to care for more dependent residents.
In the case of a binding CON or moratorium, the incentives may be altered due to excess demand on the part of Medicaid recipients. Because certain individuals are unable to obtain care, an access problem will persist despite the tailoring of payments to different dependency/ cost levels under case-mix reimbursement. Rather than excluding the costly heavy-care residents as under a uniform payment level, nursing homes now will exclude the resident whose case-mix adjusted payment offers the smallest differential over marginal costs (Nyman, Levey and Rohrer 1987) . Depending on the relative size of these differentials, the excluded residents may be light-, moderate-, or heavy-care residents. 5 Thus, if case-mix reimbursement is to improve access to care for heavy-care Medicaid recipients under a binding bed constraint, the reward (MR-MC) for heavy-care categories always must dominate the moderate-and lightcare categories. Because of the inherent difficulties in designing a payment structure that always differentially rewards the heavy-care categories, the adoption of a case-mix payment system is predicted to increase access to care for more dependent residents under a binding bed constraint, but the magnitude of the effect will be modified by the restrictiveness of the market.
The improvement of quality often is cited as an objective in implementing case-mix reimbursement (Butler and Schlenker 1989) . In order to evaluate the effect of the adoption of casemix reimbursement policies on quality, two factors must be considered. First, the provision of a level of quality depends on whether the casemix system is designed to be cost increasing, cost decreasing, or cost neutral. Most case-mix systems are designed to be cost increasing with the case-mix adjusted payment offering an antidote to the already strong measures to limit spending on the part of homes under a prospective-based system (Feder and Scanlon 1989) . Thus, an observed increase in quality under case-mix reimbursement may be attributable to an increase in the level of payment rather than the case-mix adjusted payment schedule itself. Second, the provision of a particular level of quality hinges on the underlying case mix of residents within a home. By design, case-mix payment systems reward facilities for the care of more dependent residents. Thus, an observed decrease (or increase) in quality with the adoption of a case-mix system may be attributable to sicker (or healthier) residents.
Both the conceptual and empirical quality analyses offered in this study hold these two factors constant in examining the effect of casemix reimbursement on nursing home quality. In a market without a bed constraint, homes have an incentive to compete for the care of Medicaid recipients. Put alternatively, homes will add quality up to the point that the additional revenue associated with Medicaid residents attracted by the change in quality equals the marginal cost of that quality. Homes that admit sicker patients under case-mix reimbursement will have the incentive to provide more intensive care or risk losing market share to other providers. Thus, if we hold both the generosity of the payment system and resident acuity constant, the adoption of a case-mix payment system is predicted to have no effect on quality in markets without a binding bed constraint in place.
In a market with a binding bed constraint, nursing homes do not view a Medicaid payment as a reward for quality, because Medicaid residents are available (due to the binding bed constraint) regardless of the level of quality. Although quality is expected to be lower in a market with a binding bed constraint relative to one with free entry, the adoption of a case-mix payment system under a bed constraint is not predicted to lead to lower quality. The adoption of case-mix payment does not provide the incentive to necessarily lower quality, because there was no incentive to provide quality prior to the adoption of case-mix payment under a binding bed constraint. Thus, if we control for resident acuity, we should not observe lower quality with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement regardless of the presence of a bed constraint.
In sum, three hypotheses emerge from this conceptual framework regarding the adoption of a case-mix payment system: Ⅺ Case-mix payment will improve access for more dependent residents; Ⅺ The effect of case-mix payment on access for dependent residents will be modified in the presence of a binding bed constraint; Ⅺ Holding the generosity of the Medicaid payment system and the level of resident functioning constant, case-mix payment will not affect the overall level of quality regardless of the presence of a bed constraint. Methods
Data
To test these various hypotheses, this study used a longitudinal data set linking the yearly files of the federal Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system from 1991 through 1998 for the 48 contiguous states (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia). The OSCAR system contains information from state surveys of all federally certified Medicaid and Medicare homes in the United States. Certified homes were estimated to represent almost 96% of the 16,700 facilities nationwide in 1995 (Strahan 1997) . Collected and maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems (CMS, formerly the Health Care Financing Administration [HCFA]), the OSCAR data are used to determine whether homes are in compliance with federal regulatory requirements. 6 Every facility is required to have an initial survey to verify compliance. Thereafter, states are required to survey each facility no less often than every 15 months; the average is about every 12 months .
Between 1991 and 1998, there were 125,395 surveys of 18,196 nursing homes within the 48 contiguous states (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). On average, each facility was surveyed 6.88 times over the 1991-98 period. Importantly, the surveys collected over time from each facility are not independent. This issue of clustering is addressed in the estimation procedure by using a robust standard error estimator that corrects for intra-home cluster correlation. The mean number of surveys in each year was 15,674, with a low of 13,313 surveys reported in 1991 and a high of 17,135 surveys reported in 1996.
Three other data sources were utilized within this study to supplement the OSCAR data. First, the OSCAR data were merged with aggregate county-level demographic, socioeconomic, and health status data from the Bureau of Health Professions' Area Resource File (ARF). Second, state-level Medicaid reimbursement methods and levels were obtained from multiple editions of the State Data Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics (e.g., Harrington et al. 1999) . And third, the annual HCFA (now CMS) hospital wage indexes were linked with the data.
In a review of case-mix adjustment systems, Fries (1990) noted that ADLs form the cornerstone of nursing home resident classification and that each of the seven case-mix systems evaluated in his study incorporated them in a major Cohen and Spector (1996) . b This variable is constructed using the OSCAR and ARF files.
role. Unfortunately, the facility-level OSCAR data did not allow a reconstruction of the resident-level case-mix index used in the RUG-III system. As such, this study used an ADL-based measure as a proxy for resident dependency. The measure is a case-mix index expressed in minutes of staff time per day typically employed in the care of residents based on their dysfunctions and the subsequent procedures they required. Minutes were estimated using weights based on the Management Minutes system designed by Bill Thoms (Cohen and Spector 1996) . The average number of minutes required per resident in each home was calculated using information on the number of residents requir-ing assistance with ADLs (bathing, dressing, eating, and walking) and special services (skin care, pressure sore treatment, parenteral feeding, tube feeding, and bowel/bladder retraining). The formula for this ''minutes index'' is reported in a footnote to Table 1 .
Because nursing home quality is a multidimensional construct, a number of alternative measures were used as proxies in this study; all have been used previously as quality measures in the nursing home literature (see Grabowski 2001a) . The outcome-oriented measure of quality was the proportion of residents with pressure sores (or decubitis ulcers), commonly associated with immobility in the elderly. Pressure sores are areas of the skin and underlying tissues that erode as a result of pressure or friction and/or lack of blood supply.
The proportion of residents with catheters, feeding tubes, and physical restraints were used as procedural measures of quality. Because labor constitutes 60% to 70% of nursing home costs, these services may be employed as laborsaving practices on the part of nursing homes with potential negative consequences for resident health. Urethral catheterization places the resident at greater risk for urinary tract infection, which may result in hospitalization. Other long-term complications include bladder and renal stones, abscesses, and renal failure. The use of feeding tubes can result in complications including self-extubation, infections, aspiration, unintended misplacement of the tube, and pain. Finally, immobility resulting from the use of physical restraints may increase the risk of pressure ulcers, depression, and mental and physical deterioration, as well as increase the risk of mortality (Zinn 1993) . The number of registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and nurses' assistants (NAs) per resident day were used as resource-based (or structural) measures of quality.
To test whether case-mix reimbursement affected resident dependency and quality, a statelevel dummy variable was used to indicate whether the state employed a case-mix reimbursement system for a particular year. Although different states employ different casemix adjustment methodologies, this variable broadly captures the implications of case-mix reimbursement for resident dependency and quality of care. This study has the advantage over previous studies of moving to a national framework, which increases the scope and generalizability of the findings. However, it should be noted that this dummy-variable approach has the disadvantage of losing some of the statelevel institutional detail that helps to define case-mix payment.
The number of states with case-mix reimbursement grew from 18 in 1991 to 26 in 1998. During this time period, Vermont (1992), Nebraska (1992) , Wisconsin (1993) , Kansas (1994) , Maine (1994 ), Mississippi (1994 ), South Dakota (1994 , and Pennsylvania (1996) adopted case-mix Medicaid reimbursement for nursing home care, and Ohio dropped (1992) and then re-adopted (1994) case-mix reimbursement. Thus, nine states changed their case-mix payment policy over this time period. Four of the states (Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, and South Dakota) adopted case-mix reimbursement as part of the HCFA Multistate Nursing Home Case-Mix and Quality Demonstration project. All of the states except Wisconsin used some variation of the RUG-III system to adjust Medicaid payments to nursing facilities. Although Wisconsin does not consider its system ''casemixed,'' patient characteristics were used to set rates for eight different levels of care (Harrington et al. 1999 ). All of the subsequent results presented here are robust to the exclusion of Wisconsin from the analysis.
The number of nursing home surveys conducted in the nine states that changed their casemix policy between 1991 and 1998 was 25,616, which represents slightly more than 20% of all facilities in the contiguous states. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics across states with and without case-mix reimbursement for the various dependency and quality measures. The first column of the table contains data for states that never had case-mix reimbursement during the study period ; the second column presents data for states that always had case-mix reimbursement during the study period; the final two columns isolate states that changed their case-mix policy during the period of study by examining the pre-adoption (column 3) and post-adoption (column 4) years. In a comparison of the pre-and post-adoption categories, casemix payment was associated with a higher resident dependency, relatively similar staffing per resident day, and slightly better quality as represented by the outcome and process measures.
In addition to the presence of case-mix reimbursement, the analysis also controlled for the Medicaid reimbursement rate. Rather than include a facility-level reimbursement ratewhich would be endogenous to a facility's casemix and quality level-the analysis utilized the average rate for the state. If the state dealt in aggregates (policing for bad apples aside), no individual home had enough market share or political clout to affect the state's reimbursement rate. Thus, to the individual home, the average state Medicaid rate was exogenous. When using national nursing home data, other recent economic analyses of Medicaid payment (e.g., Co- Note: All data are from the OSCAR system. There are a small number of missing observations for certain measures. a Comparisons between states that never or always had case-mix reimbursement for the 1991-98 period were all statistically different at the 1% level except the minutes index, LPN, and bedsores measures. b Comparisons between the pre-and post-adoption groups were all statistically different at the 1% level except the LPN and feeding tube measure.
hen and Spector 1996; Grabowski 2001b) have controlled for the Medicaid system type (i.e., prospective or retrospective). However, this measure was omitted from this analysis because it was highly collinear with the state-level fixed effects due to the small number of states that changed system types between 1991 and 1998. A series of exogenous market-level variables were included as controls in the regression analysis. The variables are the median income of people living in the nursing home's county, the population of individuals over age 65 per square mile in the county, a measure of the health status of the home's residents (for only the quality models), the HCFA (now CMS) area hospital wage rate, and a Herfindahl index of market concentration. 7 The measure of case mix was based on an activities of daily living index, which includes the need for assistance with bathing, dressing, eating, toileting, and walking. A home's ADL score was calculated by summing the number of ADLs that residents needed assistance with and dividing by the total number of residents in the home. The result is an index of the average functioning level for the residents in each facility. Additionally, binary indicators were included for several facility-level variables. The first facility-level characteristic is the facility's ownership status. Nursing homes op-erate under one of three categories: for-profit, not-for-profit, and government. The second facility characteristic is whether the home is part of a multiple-facility chain. Finally, the analysis controlled for whether the nursing home is a hospital-based facility.
The identification of excess demand conditions across nursing home markets is a critical issue towards testing the hypotheses generated in the previous section. The ideal measure of excess demand would be the number of Medicaid-eligible individuals in a given market unable to obtain an available bed due to a CON or construction moratorium law. However, this type of information is not typically available with facility-oriented data such as that employed in this and other economic analyses. As a result, previous studies have taken two approaches to identifying excess demand conditions. The first approach is to restrict the analysis to a single state that is known to have a tight bed supply due to a CON or moratorium (e.g., Gertler 1989) . Because nearly all states (44 in 1998) regulated the supply of beds with CON or construction moratoria and there was limited within-state variation in these policies during the 1990s, it would not have been sufficient to simply isolate those states with bed constraint policies in this study. Furthermore, it is no longer clear that CON and construction moratoria were always binding due to declining occupancy rates in many areas between 1991 and 1998.
A second approach is to use a measure of market restrictiveness as a proxy for excess demand. Measures used within the literature have included home and marketwide occupancy rates (e.g., Nyman 1985) , empty beds per 1,000 elderly people living in the market (e.g., Cohen and Spector 1996) , and a lagged measure of empty beds per 1,000 elderly (Grabowski 2001b) . A bed constraint is assumed to be more restrictive in those markets with fewer empty beds and less restrictive in those markets with more empty beds. A potential criticism of these restrictiveness measures is that they may be endogenous to quality in markets with fewer nursing facilities, because fewer empty beds are thought to be associated with higher quality at the facility level. This analysis uses the number of empty beds per 1,000 community-dwelling elderly (age 65ϩ) in a nursing home market to identify those markets that were least and most bed constrained. The least restrictive markets were identified as those markets having above the median number of empty beds per elderly individual for each year over the entire period 1991 through 1998. Similarly, the most restrictive markets were identified as those markets having below the median number of empty beds per elderly for each year over the 1991-98 period. In order to address the potential endogeneity issue, those markets that had less than five homes were eliminated when identifying the least and most restrictive markets. 8 Two issues regarding these data merit additional discussion. First, the county was used to approximate the market for nursing home care within this study. Most economic studies have used the county as a proxy for the nursing home market (e.g., Nyman, Levey, and Rohrer 1987; Zinn 1994; Cohen and Spector 1996) . As noted by Banaszak-Holl, Zinn, and Mor (1996) , the county may be a reasonable approximation of the market for nursing home care given patterns of funding and resident origin. For example, federal block grant funds for long-term care services are distributed at the county level. Furthermore, Gertler (1989) found that 75% of residents in New York facilities previously had lived in the county where the home was located. Similarly, Nyman (1994) found 80% of resi-dents in Wisconsin facilities chose a nursing home located in the county in which they resided before entering the home. However, Zwanziger, Mukamel, and Indridason (2002) argue that resident-origin data is preferable to county boundaries in delineating nursing home markets. Using New York state data, the authors found that nursing home markets located in urban areas were smaller than those that result from assuming countywide markets. Unfortunately, the OSCAR system does not provide resident-origin information.
Second, because homes are not surveyed at a single point in time, each facility surveyed in a calendar year was assigned the annual value from the ARF or the HCFA wage indexes. Facilities may have been surveyed multiple times in a calendar year or not at all. Thus, the Herfindahl index and excess demand measure were constructed for each calendar year by using only the most recent survey if there were multiple surveys during the year. Additionally, if a home was not surveyed during a calendar year, any surveys conducted within 45 days of the calendar year also were included to account for the fact that surveys must occur within a 15-month interval.
Empirical Specification
The empirical models for the dependency and quality measures employed in this study exploit the panel nature of the OSCAR data to examine the adoption of case-mix reimbursement. The basic specification for the empirical results presented here is:
where Y hst refers to the resident dependency or quality measure for nursing home h in state s at time t; Z hst includes an intercept and a set of exogenous controls; v s is a state fixed effect (a vector of state dummy variables); w t is a yearspecific intercept (a vector of dummy variables), and ⑀ hst is the error term. X st represents both of the key Medicaid state-level policy variables: the state's case-mix reimbursement policy and the state's aggregate reimbursement rate in 1998 dollars. The state fixed-effects control for any fixed state-specific omitted variables correlated with the propensity to care for more dependent residents or to provide additional quality. The year dummies control for national trends in de-pendency/quality that may be correlated with the implementation of case-mix reimbursement. 9 Thus, the basic identification strategy implicit in equation 1 purges the unobserved and potentially confounded cross-sectional heterogeneity by relying on the within-state variation in casemix reimbursement over time and by using states that did not face changed policies as a control for unrelated time-series variation.
For the minutes and staffing measures, efficient estimates of the parameters in equation 1 are given by the weighted least squares (WLS) estimator. Because we are ultimately interested in residents within facilities rather than the facilities themselves, these importance weights take into account the number of Medicaid residents within each facility. For the outcome and process quality measures, Y hst refers to the proportion of residents in home h in state s and year t that satisfy a particular definition. Specifically, bedsores, catheters, tube feedings, and physical restraints are all binary measures at the individual level. Because these measures are reported at the facility level (e.g., the proportion of residents with a bedsore), it is straightforward to convert the data into binary choices grouped at the facility level. Thus, a generalized linear model (GLM) is used to fit a binomial regression model grouped at the home level (Mc-Cullagh and Nelder 1989 ).
An important methodological point concerns the fact that the ''grouped'' nature of the key explanatory variable of interest (i.e., case-mix reimbursement at the state level) may have introduced heteroscedasticity and biased the estimates of the parameter standard errors. When the true specification of the residual variancecovariance matrix follows a grouped structure, Moulton (1990) has shown that estimates of the standard errors will be biased downwards. A straightforward and unrestrictive approach to addressing this issue is to adjust the standard errors using the Huber-White robust estimator. Because homes may have been surveyed multiple times during the study period, inference statistics are corrected for intra-home cluster correlations.
The regression results are contained in Tables 3-7. Specification (1) in these tables contains the model described previously without the state and year dummies. Specification (2) is this same model with state and year fixed effects. To test the hypotheses regarding the effect of case-mix reimbursement on resident dependency and quality within an excess demand paradigm, the model with state and year effects is isolated to the least restrictive markets in specification (3) and the most restrictive nursing home markets in specification (4). These markets are identified based on the excess demand measure described in the previous section. Due to space considerations, in Table 7 only the case-mix coefficients, standard errors, marginal effects, and number of observations are reported for the bedsore, physical restraint, catheter, and feeding tube measures. Full regression results are available upon request from the author.
Results

Resident Dependency Measure
The empirical analyses first examine the effect of case-mix reimbursement on resident dependency as measured by the index of minutes of staff time per resident day (see Table 3 ). The advantage of controlling for fixed effects is illustrated by comparing specifications (1) and (2). When state and year dummies are excluded, the estimated case-mix coefficient is quite small (.01) and not statistically significant. Although not reported here, the inclusion of year dummies alone did not significantly alter the estimated case-mix coefficient in this model. However, the case-mix coefficient is of the expected sign when state fixed effects are included, which provides strong support for the argument that there are important and unobserved state-specific attributes that influence both resident dependency and the adoption of case-mix reimbursement.
Similar to previous research, this fixed-effects model suggests that case-mix reimbursement has a large and statistically significant effect on resident dependency. Case-mix reimbursement is associated with nursing home residents requiring 3.37 (i.e., 3.2%) additional minutes of care time per day. In percentage terms, this result is a bit smaller than earlier estimates reviewed previously from a single state, which ranged from 5.5% to 7.5% (Feder and Scanlon 1989; Holahan and Cohen 1987; Thorpe, Gertler, and Goldman 1991) .
In addition to examining the overall effect of case-mix reimbursement, the effect also is analyzed in the context of bed constraint policies. The least restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were above the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire 1991-98 period.
b
The most restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were below the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire period 1991-98.
Case-mix reimbursement was predicted to increase resident dependency in less restrictive markets, but this effect was expected to be modified in more restrictive markets. A test of these predictions is provided by the estimates presented in specifications (3) and (4), which isolates the fixed-effects model to the least and most restrictive markets. As predicted, the effect of case-mix reimbursement on the minutes index was greater in the less restrictive markets (3.83 minutes) as compared with the more restrictive markets (1.87 minutes). The result was statistically different from zero for the least restrictive markets, but not for the most restrictive markets. Moreover, a Chow test from a pooled model indicates that the case-mix coefficient is different across the most and least restrictive models. Thus, there is strong support for the first two hypotheses: case-mix payment improves access for more dependent residents, but the effect is modified in the presence of a bed constraint.
Staffing Measures
The estimated model provides an inconsistent picture of the effect of case-mix reimbursement on nursing home resources using the three staffing measures (see Tables 4-6 ). In examining the overall results that include state and year fixed effects (specification 2), the adoption of casemix reimbursement is associated with a decrease in professional staffing (i.e., RNs and LPNs), but an increase in nonprofessional staffing (i.e., NAs). The results are only statistically significant for the LPN and NA models, implying that case-mix reimbursement is associated with .05 (i.e., 6.3%) fewer LPNs per resident day and .03 (i.e., 1.6%) more NAs per resident day. Thus, there is some evidence that homes provide a lower rate of professional staff with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement.
In both the least and most restrictive nursing home markets, the quality of nursing home care was predicted to remain relatively stable with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement, ceteris paribus. In support of this prediction, the LPN results are small in magnitude and not statistically significant for either the least or most restrictive markets. There is a positive and statistically significant effect of case-mix reimbursement on quality in the RN model within both the least and most restrictive markets. The NA result is positive and statistically significant in the most restrictive markets, and negative and not statistically significant in the least restrictive markets. Overall, when staffing is used as a proxy for quality, there is little evidence of adverse quality behavior on the part of nursing homes due to supply constraints such as CON and moratoria. In fact, there is some evidence that homes actually provide higher quality in the most restrictive markets with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement.
Outcome and Process Measures
In examining the effect of case-mix reimbursement using outcome and process measures of quality, the results are also somewhat inconsistent (see Table 7 ). In interpreting the results, it is important to note that a negative coefficient is associated with a positive effect of case-mix reimbursement on quality, because each of the measures is a negative indicator of nursing home quality (e.g., a higher prevalence of bedsores entails lower quality). I report the marginal effects of case-mix payment on each of the quality measures within brackets below the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The marginal effects are more useful than the binomial coefficients because they allow for a more intuitive interpretation and they can be compared directly to the estimates reported in prior research. In general, the fixed-effects results in specification (2) indicate the adoption of a casemix payment policy did not adversely affect quality. The case-mix reimbursement coefficients are not statistically different from zero for the bedsore, catheter, and feeding tube measures. However, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of case-mix reimbursement on physical restraint use. As shown by the marginal effect reported in brackets, physical restraint use increased by .7 percentage points (or 4.0%).
Specifications (3) and (4) examine the effect of case-mix reimbursement on quality in the least and most restrictive markets. In the least restrictive markets, case-mix reimbursement did not have a statistically significant effect on any of the four quality measures. In the most restrictive markets, there was a negative and statistically significant effect of case-mix payment on the catheter and feeding tube measures. Thus, using the outcome and process quality measures, there is no evidence that the adoption of case- The least restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were above the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire 1991-98 period.
The most restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were below the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire period 1991-98. The least restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were above the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire 1991-98 period.
The most restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were below the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire period 1991-98. Notes: Huber-White standard errors with an intra-home cluster correction are presented in parentheses. Marginal effects are presented in brackets. All models include variables measuring the hospital area wage rate, a Herfindahl index, the median per capita income, elderly individuals per square mile, the average Medicaid reimbursement rate, an activities of daily-living-score, the natural log of total residents and binary indicators for nonprofit-owned, government-owned, chain-owned, and hospital-based facilities. Full regression results are available upon request from the author. a The least restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were above the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire 1991-98 period. b The most restrictive markets were identified as those markets that were below the annual median number of empty beds per community-dwelling elderly for the entire period 1991-98. * Statistically significant with a p-value Ͻ .05. ** Statistically significant with a p-value Ͻ .01. mix reimbursement has a negative effect on quality, regardless of the restrictiveness of the market. Similar to the staffing results, there is some evidence that the use of case-mix payment improves quality in the most restrictive markets.
In summary of the quality results, the adoption of case-mix reimbursement was found to decrease professional staffing and have little observed effect on process and outcome measures of quality. Quality problems were not observed with the adoption of case-mix payment in the most restrictive markets
Discussion
Although many states recently have adopted case-mix Medicaid payment systems for nursing home care, previous research has provided an incomplete picture as to the effect of these policies on resident dependency and quality in the context of bed constraint regulations (Norton 2000) . Previous studies have examined either longitudinal data for a single state or cross-sectional data from multiple states. This study used panel data for all certified nursing homes in the United States between 1991 and 1998, a period in which nine states changed their case-mix policies. This panel approach provided a unique opportunity to consider the implications of casemix reimbursement on resident dependency and quality in the presence of bed constraint regulations.
The stated policy goal of case-mix reimbursement is to improve access for heavy-care Medicaid recipients. As expected, this study found that the adoption of a case-mix payment system was associated with the care of more dependent residents. However, case-mix reimbursement only restructures the payment system, it does not address the excess demand for nursing home care under CON and construction moratoria. As a result, the least profitable patients-who may or may not be heavy-care patients-still may be excluded under a case-mix payment system. Due to the suspected difficulty in designing a payment structure in which heavy-care patients are always the most profitable, this study found that excess demand conditions modified the incentive to care for more disabled patients. Although there is less excess demand in nursing home markets now than two decades ago, in 1998, 44 states still had CON or construction moratoria in place to regulate the growth of new nursing beds and facilities. The results from this study imply that the goal of case-mix reimbursement-increased access to care for sicker patients-would be better served by a further repeal of bed constraint regulations to encourage greater competition for more dependent residents.
The incentive for nursing homes to provide lower quality under case-mix reimbursement has also been an important concern. Anecdotal reports and the limited previous empirical evidence available indicated that this concern is justified (e.g., Weissert and Musliner 1992) . Although previous research has not examined the adoption of case-mix reimbursement in the context of bed constraint regulations, earlier analyses have found the effect of Medicaid payment levels on quality to be modified under excess demand conditions (e.g., Grabowski 2001b ). However, in support of the conceptual framework, this study did not find lower quality with the adoption of case-mix reimbursement using outcome and process measures of quality.
These new findings do not diminish quality concerns with case-mix reimbursement, but rather underscore some of the recent efforts to address this issue. Such initiatives have been twofold. First, there has been increased awareness in the design of the case-mix based systems regarding potential adverse quality incentives. Fries and colleagues (1994) used the example of indwelling catheters to illustrate this point. Individuals with catheters require more resources, but not primarily for catheter care. The catheter itself is relatively inexpensive, but the presence of a catheter is a potential signal of a highercost patient, because catheter use is correlated with other resource-intensive procedures. Thus, if catheters are included as a criterion for higher payment, then the case-mix system may provide homes the inappropriate incentive to catheterize residents. To address this issue, the RUG-III payment system, where possible, is based on the need for services rather the actual use of services.
Second, the adoption of case-mix reimburse-ment has been tied to better data organization, monitoring, and assessment, especially in the Case-Mix Demonstration project states. Beginning in 1990, all states were federally mandated to collect a quarterly clinical assessment, using the ''minimum data set (MDS),'' for all residents within Medicare-or Medicaid-certified nursing homes. The MDS is the data file used to construct the RUG-based payment system. As part of the HCFA demonstration project, a number of quality indicators were developed using the MDS to identify potentially poor nursing home care practices and outcomes. For example, there are quality indicators for each of the process (i.e., tube feedings, catheters and physical restraints) and outcome (i.e., bedsores) measures employed within this study. Zimmerman and colleagues (1995) offered several ways in which states can use these quality indicators for quality monitoring, including structuring the collection of information, identifying problem facilities, identifying problem areas of care, identifying individual resident care problems, monitoring follow-up, and serving as a basis for data-driven complaints from residents, family members, or other advocates. There is the added benefit that the same data that are used for payment are also used for quality monitoring. Thus, facilities may have less incentive to provide misinformation or otherwise attempt to game the payment system. Facilities that over-report case mix will be identified as outliers on certain quality indicators, and facilities that under-report quality problems will reduce their RUG-based payment (Zimmerman et al. 1995) .
Although quality was not found to decrease using process and outcome measures of quality, this study did find that professional staffing decreased with the adoption of a case-mix payment system. Taken together, these two findings are observationally equivalent with very different hypotheses. If professional staffing is associated with dimensions of quality not measured by the process and outcome variables, then one could argue that low staffing under case-mix reimbursement is an important area of interest for policymakers. Recent calls for minimum staffing standards in the nursing home industry and concern regarding whether nursing time associated with the RUG-III payment categories are sufficient (Mueller 2000) certainly would support this viewpoint.
However, if the process and outcome measures included within this study adequately measure nursing home quality, then increased professional staffing may not be necessary for improved quality under case-mix reimbursement. The staff-quality relationship may be nonlinear in that increases in quality may occur with staffing up to some threshold, after which the relationship disappears (Davis 1991) . This simply may occur due to diminishing returns or because excess staff reflects poor management. Future research regarding the relationship between staffing and quality under case-mix payment will be necessary.
This study found that case-mix reimburse-ment improved access for more dependent residents, decreased professional staffing, and had no significant effect on process and outcome measures of quality. The restrictiveness of the market, a proxy for whether CON and construction moratoria serve as a binding bed constraint, was found to modify the effect of case-mix payment on access to care for more dependent residents. However, the restrictiveness of the market was not found to be an important factor towards the provision of quality under case-mix payment. Further research will be necessary to parse out how variation in the design, implementation, and oversight of each state's casemix payment system affects these findings.
Notes
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1 In this study, quality is operationalized by a number of process, structural, and outcome measures of care. Unfortunately, I am not able to directly address the misreporting of resident conditions or services within the empirical analyses. 2 Pressure ulcers are areas of the skin and underlying tissues that erode as a result of pressure or friction and/or lack of blood supply. 3 Feder and Scanlon (1989) recognize the counter argument that tube feeding and oxygen therapy services still were used relatively infrequently following the adoption of case-mix payment in Maryland. The proportion of residents with tube feedings grew from 1.2% to 2.3%, and the proportion with oxygen therapy grew from .4% to .8%. Furthermore, the observed increases were much smaller for other services that providers could control (e.g., injections grew by only 4.3%) and almost as large for procedures that providers could not control (e.g., ostomy care grew by 42.9%). Taken in sum, there is no means of determining whether the increase in use of services is driven by over-utilization following the implementation of a case-mix system or under-utilization prior to implementation. 4 Although somewhat dated and limited to a single state, Nyman (1988) calculated the marginal cost of a day of nursing home care in New York state in 1983 and found that the marginal cost of the most dependent skilled nursing facility (SNF) resident was $9 to $12 less per patient day than the average per diem prospective Medicaid reimbursement rate for these SNF residents. 5 For example, Nyman and Conner (1994) contrast-ed the marginal costs associated with different patient types with their corresponding payment rate under Minnesota's case-mix system. The authors found that estimated costs did not match payment rates in Minnesota, which meant that certain residents were more profitable than others. In support of these calculations, the study found that the percentage change in patient days between 1986 and 1990 across various levels of care could be explained by which patient types were most profitable. 6 Because the OSCAR system is collected for the purposes of provider certification, accuracy and interstate reliability are always potential concerns when using data of this type for research purposes. 7 A Herfindahl index is a measure that is negatively related to the competitiveness of a market. This index was constructed by summing the squared market shares of all facilities in the county. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values signifying a higher concentration of facilities. 8 As a robustness check, the model also was estimated using an alternative method of identifying the most and least restrictive markets. In the primary analyses, the most (or least) restrictive markets were identified as those areas that were below (or above) the median empty beds per communitydwelling elderly measure and had at least five homes for the entire period 1991-98. The marketwide occupancy rate (i.e., the total number of residents divided by total number of beds in the county) was employed in a similar fashion and generated comparable results to the empty beds measure. 9 All of the results presented in this study are generally robust to the inclusion of a state-specific linear trend variable that controls for unobserved time variation specific to each state.
